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Preface
The "happy talk" emanating from eurozone officials of late regarding the economic crises in the periphery deserves some vigorous pushback. Focusing on the four bailed-out countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, Research Associate and Policy Fellow C. J. Polychroniou argues in this policy brief that, contrary to the burgeoning optimism in official communications, these countries' economies are still not on track for vigorous, sustainable recoveries in growth and employment-and that there is nothing surprising in this result.
As Polychroniou explains, the primary goal of the rescue programs organized by the European Union, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund was to create a "firewall" that would shield the European banking system from further turmoil. Moreover, the particular policies imposed on the four memberstates in question as a condition of their bailouts were inspired by a collection of what he describes as "dead economic dogmas." The menu of policy responses has been limited by a set of ideological convictions that are in turn bound up with the eurozone's institutional setup-convictions about the way an economy works that are being sorely tested in the light of experience.
The doctrines and corresponding policies scrutinized in this policy brief include the idea of confidence-building austerity, an unwarranted faith in structural reforms, and overreliance on exports as an engine of growth. In combination with these, policymakers have effectively treated the high unemployment rates plaguing most of the bailed-out countries as unavoidable.
Even now, unemployment ranges from roughly 27 percent in Greece to 12 percent in Ireland-although the latter's relative "success" on this metric is at least partly the result of its having the highest emigration rate in Europe. Direct employment policies along the lines of an employer-of-last-resort program have the potential to solve the jobless crisis and move eurozone economies toward full employment, but as Polychroniou suggests, they do not comport with the "worldview" that informs the current policy status quo.
The notion that imposing budget austerity in a downturn could spark economic recovery by promoting investor confidence has been revealed to be gravely flawed. GDP growth in the four bailed-out countries collapsed, and as a result, their public debt ratios have worsened since they were "rescued." Even now, there is little evidence of strong growth prospects on the horizon.
Structural reforms organized around privatization of public assets and deregulation of markets-particularly labor markets-have been treated as a catch-all solution to what ails the periphery, based on the theory that it was a bloated public sector that caused these nations' problems in the first place and labor market inefficiencies that are blocking recovery. But this diagnosis does not match the history or current reality of the crisis. And while evidence of the success of this neoliberal project in the bailed-out countries is scarce, says Polychroniou, we do see a rise in precarious working conditions (featuring a new practice of delayed wage payments), increased inequality, and a transfer of wealth from the public sector to private hands.
Finally, although exports as a percentage of GDP have increased for some among the four countries (in the case of Greece, export growth has been almost entirely in the volatile category of oil-related products), this has been accompanied by plummeting domestic consumption and little evident employment payoff. The link between exports and job creation in these countries is quite weak. Exports, while important, simply cannot provide enough jobs for the still unconscionably large unemployed population.
On the whole, budget deficits have shrunk and trade balances have improved for some of the bailed-out countries, but against these "accomplishments" we have to weigh an unabated unemployment crisis, collapse of public services, growing poverty and inequality, and social dislocation. The goal-postshifting celebrations on display recently among eurozone officials represent an attempt to muddy a fairly clear verdict; an attempt to defend the dead economic dogmas that stand in the way of a real economic recovery.
Introduction
Four years after the start of the euro crisis, the bailed-out countries of the eurozone (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) it admitted (1) that it had miscalculated the size of the fiscal multiplier and thus underestimated the negative impact of the austerity policies on the Greek economy and society, and (2) that the key idea behind the bailout plan was not to help Greece, but rather to provide a "firewall" to protect the eurozone (Waterfield 2013) . Still, the Fund has ignored the implications of its own criticism of the Greek bailout plan and has remained stubbornly committed to the dangerous idea of "expansionary austerity" (Blyth 2013) and to the doctrine of neoliberal structural adjustment. European countries (Tadeo 2013 ). Yet, Ireland's exit from the bailout program has been hailed by German Chancellor Angela
Merkel herself as a "tremendous success story" (BBC News
Europe 2014). In a similar display of indifference to the social catastrophe unfolding in Greece, but with the same touch of oldfashioned propaganda, the Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, has also described the elimination of the "twin deficits"
in his country as a "success story" (Polychroniou 2014a ).
Aside from some minor and ill-conceived youth employment programs, 2 which in reality serve as a distraction from the more serious problem of unemployment for older workers, the EU has done next to nothing to address the plague of unemployment. This stance, however, is consistent with the EU's current economic mindset, a set of economic dogmas that include
(1) relegating unemployment to the status of a natural and inevitable (and perhaps even desirable) outcome of fiscal adjustment, (2) relying on austerity as a confidence builder, (3) treating structural reform as a panacea, and (4) valuing exports as the primary engine of growth.
3
The four dimensions of this type of economic philosophy embraced by the EU are highly flawed and, when combined, they can be deadly dangerous. They constitute tenets of an ideological "worldview" rather than empirically proven statements. Little wonder, then, why the economies in the periphery of the eurozone are in such horrific shape, with no prospects for an end to the deep economic and social crisis that plagues millions of their citizens, until either the EU changes its policies or these nations exit the euro.
Unemployment and What to Do About It
To start with, it is simply unacceptable for EU policymakers not to have in place widespread measures to address unemployment, and to treat it instead as merely a "natural" and "inevitable" could go a long way toward addressing the horrific unemployment problem in the entire eurozone, which remains near record highs at 11.9 percent, with nearly half of the total made up of the long-term unemployed (Berger and Schindler 2014) . While
Europe's infrastructure is in much better shape than that of the United States overall, the unemployed could be put to use in a myriad of jobs in labor-intensive services, ranging from urban and environmental improvements to providing assistance to the elderly and the sick, just to mention a few of the activities that can take place in sectors of the economy where people can apply their general capabilities. The economic and social transformation that could come to pass in the periphery of the eurozone by putting millions of Greeks, Irish, Portuguese, and Spaniards, as well as Italians, 4 back to work through direct employment is so immense that it boggles the mind how apathetic European policymakers are toward this large-scale, transformative opportunity.
The need for direct employment programs in the eurozone becomes even more urgent when taking into account that annual growth rates in Europe are expected to be extremely low over the next several years, ranging from 1 percent to 1.6 percent on average (IMF 2014; Ernst & Young 2013) . In other words, if slow economic growth is the "new normal" in advanced capitalist societies-as some economists, such as Robert Gordon (2014; ), seem to believe-then there is a stronger case to be made for ELR, both as a means to provide stimulus to growth and to secure full employment.
The idea of employment guarantee programs is not an invention of the 1930s. Rather, it goes way back in history, embraced by thinkers who were sensitive to the problem of the unemployed poor and concerned about the economic, social, political, and moral repercussions of this state of human affairs. Nearly four years later, Greece, as the first "guinea pig" in the undertaking of the EU's barbarous austerity experiment, is still waiting for the much-talked-about recovery through confidence-building austerity. In the meantime, the country's output has been shrinking by an average annual rate of about 5.5 percent since the "rescue" plan was instituted (Greece's GDP has shrunk by nearly a quarter since the 2008 crisis), and unemployment jumped from 12 percent in 2010 to 28 percent in November 2013
as economic activity plummeted due to massive cuts in public spending. Small-and medium-size businesses shut down in record high numbers due to a crash in demand (domestic demand in Greece has been falling for seven consecutive years)
caused largely by sharp cuts in wages and salaries and even sharper tax rate increases. As for the government debt, it ballooned from slightly less than 130 percent in 2009 to 175 percent at the end of 2013-and with a sizable "haircut" already having taken place. To add insult to injury, the best that the radical structural adjustment program and the Spartan austerity measures can promise is to reduce the Greek debt ratio to 124 percent of GDP by 2020; that is, to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio close to the levels it was at when the crisis broke out, leading to the "bailout" programs. It would not, then, be overstating the case to say that the international bailouts of Greece have been an unmitigated disaster for the country (Polychroniou 2013a ).
In the rest of the bailed-out countries-Ireland, Portugal, and Spain-the enforcement of harsh austerity was based on similar reasoning: debt would be reduced and growth would be spurred if these societies proceeded with the implementation of substantial public spending cuts and adhered to an agenda of structural reforms for the purpose of making their economies more competitive. Again, the impetus for the alleged "recovery"
as a result of the implementation of these measures would come through the restoration of confidence. In other words, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain were also turned into "guinea pigs" for the same wild neoliberal experiment that Greece had already been subjected to with evidently disastrous results, which brings to mind a quote often attributed to Einstein: "Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results."
The effects of the austerity medicine on the other three peripheral economies of the eurozone were indeed quite devastating. 7 Take government debt ratios, which, as in the case of Greece, we were promised would be decreased through austerity. Shrinking national outputs, increased debt loads, and unacceptable unemployment rates form, however, only part of the grim reality of economic recession in the peripheral countries of the eurozone. Because of the draconian budget cuts, vital public services have been cut to the bare bone, all while poverty has exploded, the numbers of homeless people are mounting, and inequality is growing to dangerous levels. Austerity policies have had an especially devastating effect on public health (Stuckler and Basu 2013), with Greece being widely recognized as experiencing nothing short of a public health tragedy (Kentikelenis et al. 2014; Faiola 2014) , as a huge and still growing percentage of the population no longer has access to health care, infant mortality rates are rising, and even malaria is making a comeback (Cooper 2014) .
The fact that austerity hasn't worked for the bailed-out countries of the eurozone (or anywhere else in Europe, for that matter) is beyond dispute when looked at from the standpoint of the impact it has had on growth, unemployment, public debt accumulation, and social well-being. As for austerity reducing government deficits-which is the only "positive" thing that austerity has to show in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain-the whole process is self-defeating because it deepens the recession, which leads to a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than before, and to higher unemployment and greater human misery. Austerity is indeed a phony solution, and the tragic experience of the bailedout countries provides proof of that beyond a reasonable doubt.
The policy of slashing public spending, wages, and salaries and raising taxes as a means of addressing high government deficits and debt when economies are experiencing severe downturns, and expecting this policy to serve as a mechanism for growth, is an easy entry into the club of "zombie economic ideas" (Quiggin 2012 ). The only confidence that austerity can generate is the certainty that the future will look worse than the present, creating a "lost generation" through depressed economies and highly unequal societies, as confirmed by a report released last year by Charita Europa (McEnroe 2013), with the organization going against the grain and, to its credit, making a plea for a government investment package to tackle the problem of unemployment.
(The Myth of) Neoliberal Structural Reforms as a Panacea
The intellectual case against austerity is rather easy to make because so much empirical data is stacked up against it. However, the third dimension of the EU's current economic gestalt-deep structural reforms aligned with the neoliberal vision of economic operations-poses greater challenges due to the complexities involved in the comparison of economies with different cultural environments and institutional settings, and because, as a result, the effects of neoliberal policies have not been uniform across economies. Thus, in general, structural reforms enjoy more support even amongst people who seem to be rather skeptical about the benefits of austerity, although the experience with neoliberal structural reforms has been extremely negative when it comes to matters of inequality and inefficiency for many countries around the world (SAPRIN 2002) . Part of the explanation for this "anomaly" is undoubtedly due to the consolidation of neoliberalism as a hegemonic system, with neoliberalism itself having become the "central organizing principle" for the European project since the Maastricht Treaty (Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Polychroniou 2013b) , and to the fact that alternative policies for exiting the current crisis rarely receive the widespread public attention that they deserve-although in many instances they provide realistic, and perhaps the only possible, solutions for the most overburdened and unbalanced economies of the eurozone. In Europe, neoliberal structural reforms have been adopted as a major objective of economic policy since the Maastricht Treaty, primarily as a means of increasing competitiveness-and therefore securing a larger share of profits for capital. In general, structural reforms stand "as a euphemism for deregulation, reduction of union rights, etc." (Arestis and Sawyer 2014) . With the European Central Bank having jumped on the bandwagon, structural reforms are mandated by EU authorities alongside austerity for the purpose of fiscal consolidation. The claim, of course, is that "structural reforms" will produce greater growth potential and thus more jobs.
In other words, the answer to the very problems created by antigrowth austerity policies now rests with radical labor market reforms, further liberalization, and more privatization. To be sure, in the case of all four peripheral eurozone countries discussed above, the same claims were made by the EU authorities and IMF officials-namely, that there were labor market inefficiencies that contributed to a loss in competitiveness (and thus to high deficits and debt levels as well as high unemployment rates) and that reducing the cost of labor would increase employment. In all four cases (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain), the alleged culprit was the public sector (allegedly bloated, corrupt, and with an inherent propensity to run huge deficits), while inflexible markets and high labor costs were the forces that supposedly prevented rapid recovery. There was total silence over the fact that it was actually the private sector (mainly the banking and financial sector) that brought about the calamity in all four countries in question, even if in the case of Greece the crisis took the shape of a fiscal crisis when private lenders (mostly European banks overflowing with cash that could not find proper investment opportunities) stopped pouring excessive amounts of money into the economy.
As with austerity, the claims about the alleged benefits of neoliberal structural reforms were not drawn on the basis of measurable data but rested purely on ideological bias, which The problem with structural reforms is that they treat labor markets like any other market. In this context, workers are commodities to be used and disposed of like any other product.
Hence the retreat of contemporary policymakers and mainstream economists from the "full employment" vision that was central to Keynes's own work. Hence, also, the double standard applied in today's labor markets to corporate executives and workers, with the former enjoying all sorts of privileges, outrageous salaries, and highly generous protection packages in the event of termination while average workers enjoy minimum wages, no protection from dismissal, and lower unemployment benefits.
In the bailed-out countries of the eurozone, in addition to massive unemployment, structural reforms have brought about a new element in capitalist practices: companies rarely pay their workers on time, in many cases delaying wage payments anywhere from three months to a year, and with payments made mostly in small installments. According to the Labor Institute of the General Confederation of Greek Workers, this practice applies today to more than half of all Greek businesses, with workers basically unable to do anything about it other than simply quit their job and join the ever-growing ranks of the unemployed-but without access to unemployment benefits. A similar (but not as widespread) phenomenon of delayed payments is also found to exist in Portugal, but, unlike in Greece, special arrangements are in place in order to provide some kind of protection to employees who suffer from the practice.
In sum, the evidence that "structural reforms" can boost jobs in the context of fiscal consolidation is hard, if not impossible, to locate in the case of the bailed-out countries of the eurozone.
What "structural reforms" do accomplish, however, is create The notion that "structural reforms" can serve as a tool to solve major economic problems can best be described as a scam.
Indeed, it appears to be the case, as Paul Krugman so pointedly put it recently, that "structural reform is the last refuge of scoundrels" (Krugman 2014) .
Are Exports a Troubled Economy's Salvation?
Exports have been identified by the EU as a primary engine of growth, in all likelihood due to the success of the German experience with export-led growth, but also, one could argue, because of the overall neo-Hooverian posture (Polychroniou 2012 ) that its policymakers have adopted in the age of the crisis of the euro, in which the use of fiscal tools for the creation of jobs and growth has been permanently excised from the policymaking process.
The suppression of wages in the eurozone periphery was intended to increase competitiveness and thus provide a boost to their exports. To some extent, this strategy has worked, in the sense that the trade balances of peripheral nations have been improved in the last few years, with Portugal, surprisingly enough, experiencing a most impressive increase in its exports (Wise 2014) , but far more so Spain, which has not traditionally been a strong exporter (Benoit and Baigorri 2013) . In the case of Spain, in fact, "the share of exports in GDP . . . is converging towards Germany (52% in 2012) faster than in France and Italy" (Chislett 2013) . However, in the case of both Portugal and Spain, the rate of the increase in exports has proceeded alongside a similar fall in the rate of domestic consumption. Ireland are not to be found in the export-oriented industries but rather in the nonexporting sectors such as the hotel and hospitality industry, wholesale and retail, and transport and storage (Lawless, McCahn, and Calder 2012) . In fact, the link between exports and job creation is extremely weak in Ireland, making a mockery of the presentation of Ireland's alleged recovery as a "success story" (O'Toole 2014); likewise in the case of Portugal and Spain, where the overwhelming majority of companies employ just a handful of workers. Moreover, in these countries the increase in exports seems to be directly related to the high unemployment rates that have reduced wages and labor costs.
In the case of Greece, the export trend has been rather disappointing. While there has been a surge of Greek exports in the last few years, it was driven by "mineral fuels, lubricants and related material" (Janssen 2012) . Thus, the increase in exports has been in the highly volatile oil-related products, while non-oil exports are struggling and have yet to return to their precrisis levels. Moreover, Greek exports are being increasingly directed toward non-EU nations, which clearly indicates that the competitiveness strategy applied in the case of Greece through the suppression of real wages is not having an effect on exports (Papadimitriou et al. 2014, 4-5 Research has also shown that, historically, most nations tend to run deficits rather than surpluses, and that large current account surpluses are not sustainable in the long run (Edwards 2007 ).
On the basis of all of the above, it seems that the export-led growth envisioned by the current EU chiefs is just another dead economic dogma, representing yet another attempt to delay the demise of the eurozone-a demise that, if it comes to pass, will be driven by the eurozone's flawed architectural foundations and its profoundly wrongheaded, indeed illegitimate, economic policies.
Conclusion
The EU/IMF rescue programs that Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain entered into were designed, above all, to provide a "firewall" for the protection of the European banking system and thus the single currency itself, rather than solve the economic problems facing those nations. The rescue programs demanded great sacrifices on the part of average citizens in those countries due to the reckless practices of banks and the financial sectorwhile the banks themselves came out clean and the eurozone returned to being a playground for bond investors. In this context, the EU/IMF duo pressed hard for austerity and structural reforms for the bailed-out countries purely on the basis of an ideological conviction (for there was no empirical evidence to back these claims) that such measures would enhance confidence, which in turn would create the proper conditions for a return to growth and higher employment.
Looking at the current situation in the four bailed-out coun- 
Notes
1. This policy brief does not deal with Cyprus, which was "bailed out" only recently.
2. The emphasis is on vocational education and training systems, with the help of a budget line that amounts to 6 bil-lion euros in total, ignoring the fact that there are already millions of young people throughout Europe with higher education degrees and professional skills who cannot find jobs simply because the eurozone, in particular, has a general macroeconomic problem where there is no job growth.
For details of the EU initiatives to address the problem of youth unemployment, see EC (2013).
3. Whether the EU is taking its cue on economic growth from
Germany's economic model, which is based on exports, or because Germany dominates the eurozone's policymaking environment hardly matters at this stage, as any alternative policy option for the eurozone would necessarily imply some kind of direct confrontation with Europe's current hegemonic power-which is none other than Germany itself.
4. Italy has so far avoided a bailout, but its economy is in a mess, having contracted for the past two years and with the current official unemployment rate standing at 12.9 percent. 7. In my assessment of the goals and aims of the so-called "rescue" plans by the EU and the IMF, I do not mean to suggest or imply that policymakers are either ignorant of the consequences of the policies they prescribe or that they are not aware of alternative policy frameworks with the potential to deliver more socially desirable outcomes. On the contrary, I
claim that they are fully aware of the economic and social repercussions that the policies they adopt will have for the majority of the people of a given nation, for they act in accordance with what is best for certain class interests and for the maintenance of the status quo.
8. The same could be said of the Levy Economics Institute's latest strategic analysis of the Greek economy; see Papadimitriou et al. (2014) .
